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THE INTERSTATE LAND SALES
FULL DISCLOSURE ACT:
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
James W. Morris*
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the subdivided land market during the last
two decades has been at a phenomenal rate. A substantial part
of this growth has been in the area of interstate land sales.
It has been estimated that subdivision promoters, through
the use of national publications, mail circulars, and the tele-
phone, have accounted for an annual sales volume in excess of
$700 million.1 Purchasers, buying-by-mail and by telephone,
have bought property in swamps, deserts, jungles and on the
sides of cliffs. 2 The subdivided land market is characterized
by volume sales of raw land purchased in bulk and offered to
low and average income individuals.
On April 28, 1969, the federal government entered into
this area of consumer protection. On that date Title XIV of
the Housing and Urban Development Act, entitled "The Inter-
state Land Sales Full Disclosure Act", became effective. 4 The
*B.A. Murray State University 1967, M.A. University of Kentucky 1968,
J.D. Vanderbilt University 1971, member of the Richland County Bar and the
South Carolina Bar, associate with Nelson, Mullins, Grier, and Scarborough in
Columbia, S. C.
On January 27, 1972, after this article was submitted for publication, cer-
tain new rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of HUD became
effective. The following article does not describe the few minor changes effected
by these regulations. These newly adopted 'rules and regulations, along with
the procedure to be followed in filing under the Act, will be the subject of a
subsequent article by the author.
1. Hearings on Interstate Mail Order Land Sales Before the Subcomm.
on Frauds and Misrepresentations Affecting the Elderly of the Special Senate
Comm. on Aging, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1964) [Hereinafter cited as
1964 Hearings].
2. Hearings on S. 2672 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as 1966 Hearings].
3. Note, Regulating the Subdiv4ded Land Market, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1528
(1968).
4. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as ILSFDA].
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Act empowers the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) to create the Office of Interstate Land Sales
Registration (OILSR) and requires disclosure of any and all
material facts concerning land that is being offered by means
of interstate commerce for sale or lease. The Act was greeted
by the subdivided land industry with apprehension and a tone
of disapproval.; Most writers, however, have generally con-
sidered it as a needed step in the area of consumer protection. 6
This article will enumerate some of the problems created
by the sale of land across state boundaries and briefly com-
ment upon and analyze some of the methods previously used
to control the industry. Strong emphasis will be placed on the
Act's propriety and effectiveness relative to consumer need
and protection vis-a-vis the land industry's capability of meet-
ing the Act's requirements.
II. THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION:
Caveat Emptor
Unless a vendor intentionally and fraudulently gives a
false representation of a material fact, the buyer who right-
fully relies on the representation and does not receive what
he anticipated, has been without remedy.7 The courts have
generally held that the rule of caveat emptor applies in the
case of a purchaser of land who relies upon an "innocent" mis-
representation made by the vendor when the purchaser by the
exercise of ordinary diligence could have ascertained the
truth." The old common law doctrine of caveat emptor varies
in application among jurisdictions. Recently the case law in-
volving the sale of realty has tended to lessen the purchaser's
obligation of due diligence required under this rule.9 The due
5. Sanford, Thinking of Buying Some Land, THE NEW REU uIc, Octo-
ber 11, 1969, at 18.
6. 113 CONG. REc. 1407, 1408 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1967) (message sent to
Congress by President Johnson regarding consumer protection legislation).
7. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor i Sales of Realty - Recent Assaults
Upon the Ride, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961).
8. See Note, Misrepresentation, Caveat Emptor and the Right to Rescind,
3 WILLAMirrTE L.. 183 (1965).
9. See Lobdell v. Miller, 114 Cal. App. 2d 328, 250 P2d 357 (1952);
Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 91, 390 P.2d 826 (1964); Libly Creek Logging,
Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Ore. 336, 358 P.2d 491 (1960) ; Schaler v. Humphrey, 198
Ore. 458, 257 P.2d 865 (1953) ; Gamble v. Beahm, 198 Ore. 537, 257 P.2d 882
(1953).
[Vol. 24
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diligence requirement has been replaced with a subjective test
of reasonableness in light of the purchaser's limited experi-
ence, knowledge, and familiarity with the area. The failure,
however, of the common law to move more rapidly in the area
of consumer protection has left injured purchasers of realty
without proper recourse. 10
The very fact that relief to injured purchasers continues
to be denied due to disclaimers of reliance" and distinctions
between active misrepresentations and passive non-disclo-
sure12 demonstrates the need for comprehensive regulations.
The innocent purchaser seeking remedies at common law was
usually faced with the heavy burden of showing fraud or
misrepresentation. Likewise, the difficulty in determining
whether the purchaser has exercised ordinary diligence or has
acted without due regard to the nature of the transaction has
caused the courts to rely on irrelevant and often minute dis-
tinctions. The necessity in the past of distinguishing between
"fact" and "opinion" has presented the courts with equally
difficult issues.
The rapid rise in the volume of transactions involving in-
terstate land sales has expanded the problems faced by the
courts. Often the purchaser buys land which he has never
seen, simply on the representation of the vendor. The un-
suspecting buyer usually has little knowledge about the area.
Often the nature of the transaction and the distance involved
make a trip to the property impractical. Even when the pur-
chaser inspects the property, he is usually unfamiliar with the
surrounding facilities, terrain, and topography and thus un-
able to render a valid appraisal. Similarly, he will normally
take the vendor's word regarding the state of the title, the
economic stability of the developer, and the proposed improve-
ments to be made on the property.'3 The common law reme-
dies have developed at a slow pace, thereby pointing out the
need for more extensive consumer protection.
10. 3 WILLAm=T L. J., supra note 8, at 186.
11. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184
N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959).
12. Haye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
See also Note, S-275 The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RuT-
GERS L. Rxv. 714 (1967).
13. 1964 Hearings, pt. 2, at 166, 168.
1972]
3
Morris: The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: Analysis and Evalu
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
III. FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Congress has authority, through its power to regulate in-
terstate commerce, to assert jurisdiction over the subdivided
land market. The power extends to the regulation of the in-
terstate transportation facilities, communications media, and
the U.S. Postal Service. In certain situations, the power may
extend even to wholly intrastate activity.14 Prior to the en-
actment of the Interstate Land Sales Act, the following un-
successful attempts were made by the federal government to
regulate the subdivision market:
(1) Postal service enforcement of the mail fraud laws;15
(2) Federal Trade Commission control of advertising; 1 6
(3) Security Exchange Commission control of offers and sales of "in-
vestment contracts".
17
Each of these attempts will be briefly discussed in the fol-
lowing material in an effort to provide the necessary back-
ground information for a better understanding of the new Act.
Mail Fraud Statutes
The mail fraud statutes provide for criminal prosecution
of any person convicted of "conducting a scheme or device for
obtaining money or property through the mail by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."18
In order to obtain a conviction, it must be proven that such a
scheme exists and that the mails are used.' 9 Actual proof of
successful fraud is not necessary.20 The Postmaster General
is empowered with authority to have mail involved in a fraud-
ulent scheme marked "fraudulent" and returned to the sender.
Before the order can be issued, however, the existence of such
a scheme must first be established at an administrative hear-
ing. 21 A preliminary injunction may be sought in a federal
court to detain incoming mail until the conclusion of the hear-
ings.
14. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 195 (1824).
15. Postal Reorganization Act, 39. U.S.C. § 3005 (1970).
16. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 53 (1970).
17. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
18. Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3005(a) (1970).
19. United States v. Hopkins, 357 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 858 (1966).
20. United States v. White, 355 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1966).
21. Kirby v. Shaw, 358 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 24
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The use of the Post Office Department to regulate fraud-
ulent land sales has several drawbacks. First, the mails must
be the source utilized to conduct the scheme. The mail fraud
statutes do not reach the developer who advertises through na-
tional publications or by word of mouth. Secondly, the mail
fraud laws require that a specific intent to defraud be shown
in order to obtain a criminal conviction. 22 Likewise, intent
must be shown before a preliminary injunction can be issued.
Thus, because of the length of time that may be required to
prove intent, the developer is able to continue his fraudulent
practice for several more weeks or even months.
Federal Trade Commission Control
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is empowered,
upon complaint and administrative hearing, to issue cease
and desist orders to any advertiser who is misrepresenting his
product.23 However, like the mail fraud statutes, the FTC is
handicapped by the complaint-hearing-appeal procedure set
out in the Commission's regulations. During this procedure
the FTC is unable to offer preventive relief to the public
against the developer. The FTC is further hindered with
problems of limited funds, time, and manpower.
24
Security Exchange Commission Control
Land sales which are of a speculative nature may be con-
trolled under the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC became in-
volved in the control of land sales in 1943 with the case of
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.25 which concerned the pro-
motion of leasehold interests in a tract of land based on nearby
oil well drilling. The extent to which the SEC had penetrated
the field was not clearly defined, however, until SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co. where the court defined "investment contracts" to
include "a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third
party .... ,,26
The problem inherent in this means of controlling inter-
22. Neilly v. Pincuss, 338 U.S. 269 (1949).
23. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
24. 21 RuTGERs L. REv, supra note 12, at 723.
25. 320 U.S. 344 (1943). The idea of including speculative land sales in
securities definition, however, was first advanced in the 1920's.
26. 328 U.S. 293 ,298, 299 (1946).
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state land sales is that all promotional schemes may not be
considered "speculative" in nature. At the same time it can
readily be seen that certain advantages would be gained by in-
cluding the subdivided land market under the 1933 Act. Such
inclusion would assure full disclosure of the transactions and
provide an administrative agency, experienced in requiring
full disclosure, with some authority. It was no doubt these
advantages that prompted Senator Harrison Williams of New
Jersey to propose S-275, the Interstate Land Sales Full Dis-
closure Act and the forerunner of the present legislation.
27
Proposed S-275, by including land transactions in the existing
definitional framework of the Securities Act, seemed a likely
alternative to the dilemma presented.
Proposed S-275 was closely patterned after the Securities
Act of 1933. It required a "registration statement" and "pro-
spectus",2 8 however, there were serious objections made to the
form of the proposed Act. The witnesses appearing before the
Senate subcommittee argued that land was not like securities
and representatives from the land industry projected sub-
stantial increases in the cost of lots as a result of the pro-
spectus requirement. 29 Nevertheless, in 1968, the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 30 was passed, retaining a re-
markable similarity to the Securities Act, but with obvious dif-
ferences from that originally proposed as S-275.31 The De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was
placed in charge of the Act and the Secretary empowered to
established the Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration
(OILSR).
IV. THE INTERSTATE LAND SALES FULL DISCLOSURE ACT
State and federal control over the subdivided land in-
dustry has largely been ineffective. The time involved in ob-
27. Hearings on S. 275 Before the Subcomin. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-36 (1967) [herein-
after cited as 1967 Hearings].
28. 1966 Hearings, supra note 2, at 91-100, 247.
29. Id. at 300.
30. ILSFDA, supra note 4.
31. It is not for the purpose of this article to discuss in great detail various
aspects of S. 275 and the various proposals under consideration. For an ex-
cellent commentary on the legislative history of S. 275 see Coffey and Welch,
Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure Comes Down to Earth, 21
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1969).
[Vol. 24
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taining convictions, the heavy burden of showing fraud or
misrepresentation, the total absence of private civil remedies,
and the general lack of injunctive relief all worked an undue
hardship on the unfortunate buyer. With the foregoing dis-
cussion as a basis for understanding the problem presented by
the interstate sale of unimproved subdivided land and the in-
ability of our past legal structure to grasp that problem and
offer adequate protection, it is now appropriate to look at the
new Act. The Act's propriety and effectiveness must be
judged on the basis of: (1) whether it meets the problems
with which the subdivided land industry and the public are
faced; (2) whether it offers sufficient protection to the public
without imposing unnecessary burdens on the industry; and
(3) whether it overcomes the infirmities of common law reme-
dies.
General Provisions
The Act requires that any developer or agent selling or leas-
ing fifty or more lots of "unimproved land" 32 as part of a
"common promotional plan" in interstate commerce, must first
file with the Secretary of HUD a "Statement of Record" dis-
closing certain information about the land. The developer
must further furnish each purchaser with a printed property
report in advance of the signing by the purchaser of any con-
tract for sale or lease.
33
The requirements of the Act are fully satisfied when dis-
closure is accomplished by filing a Statement of Record with
the Secretary of HUD and providing the purchaser with a
property report. Until a statement concerning the subdivision
has been filed and has become effective, the sale or lease of
land (unless exempt) in such subdivision is illegal. 34 The ef-
fective date of a statement or amendment is the thirtieth day
after filing unless shortened by the Secretary.
The Jurisdictional Means
The heart of the entire Act is subsection 1703 (a) which
provides the jurisdictional base on which the Act is estab-
lished.
32. "Unimproved Land" is defined in the Regulations as "lots . ..upon
which there are no residential, commercial or industrial buildings." 24 C.F.R.
§§ 1710.1 (1) (1971).
33. ILSFDA § 1703.
34. Id.
1972]
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Sec. 1703 (a) It shall be unlawful for any developer or agent, directly
or indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transporta-
tion or communication in interstate commerce, or of the mails-
(1) to sell or lease any lot in any subdivision upless a statement of
record with respect to such lot is in effect in accordance with section
1706 and a printed property report, meeting the requirements of sec-
tion 1707 of this title, is furnished to the purchaser in advance of the
signing of any contract or agreement for sale or lease by the purchaser;
and
(2) in selling or leasing, or offering to sell or lease, any lot in a
subdivision-
(A) to employ any device, scheme, or-artifice to defraud, or
(B) to obtain money or property by means of a material misrep-
resentation with respect to any information included in the statement
of record or the property report or with respect to any other in-
formation pertinent to the lot or the subdivision and upon which the
purchaser relies, or
(C) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a pur-
chaser....
The question immediately arises, to what extent may the force
and effect of the Act be circumvented by avoiding the use of
the jurisdictional means? Because of its recent enactment
there is no case law directly in point. 'Similar language in the
Securities Act has been interpreted to include the mails, tele-
phone, railroad and airplane, and even the automobile.35 Var-
ious writers have predicted that the scope of the jurisdictional
means in the Interstate Land Act may be even broader.36 This
suggestion is apparently made without cognizance of the Sen-
ate report (then S. 3497) or regulations issued pursuant to the
Act. Regulation 1710.10 (1) issued by the Secretary provides
that "the sale or lease of lots where the offering' is entirely or
almost entirely intrastate"3 7 shall be exempt from the Act.
This exemption would seem to clearly exempt intrastate trans-
actions even though interstate facilities are used in extending
the offer. This regulation is an illustration of very poor drafts-
manship on the part of the Secretary and will no doubt be a
future source of concern to OILSR and many developers. Other
35. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). See generally
Moses v. Michael, 292 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1961); Burno v. United States, 286
F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1961) ; Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961) ; Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D.
Colo. 1965) ; Moore v. German, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
36. 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv., mtpra, note 31, at 22-25.
37. 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.10(1) (1971) (emphasis added).
388 [Vol. 24
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regulations have provided no further explanation of the mean-
ing of this phrase. It does appear from the Senate report,
however, that Congress recognized the almost impossible situa-
tion of avoiding the use of interstate facilities and desired to
exempt those cases where interstate sales were very unlikely.38
The Senate report gives some indication as to the intent of
the legislators:
... furthermore, the Committee expects the Secretary to utilize the
discretion given him to exempt sales of lots in subdivisions which would
technically be covered, but which are intrastate or almost entirely intra-
state in nature-such cases as where interstate sales are very few in
number and mainly coincidental. Such a situation could arise, for
example, where a few out-of-state purchasers buy lots in a subdivision
which is only being offered for sale within the state of the land's lo-
cation or in nearby communities.39
Obviously, it is going to be necessary for the OILSR to estab-
lish practical guidelines which will offer an objective stan-
dard for determining what is "almost entirely intrastate". In
the meantime, a developer must either assume the risk of non-
compliance, register under the Act, or ask the Secretary for
an advisory opinion on the matter. In view of the Senate re-
port and Regulation 1710.10 (1) the contention that the juris-
dictional means is to have as broad an interpretation as the
Securities Act is clearly erroneous. It now remains for the
Secretary to clarify this question.
Definitional Scope of the Act
The scope of the Act extends to "subdivisions" which are
defined to be "any land which is divided or proposed to be di-
vided into fifty or more lots, whether contiguous or not, for
the purpose of sale or lease as part of a common promotional
plan .... ,,40 Earlier versions of the Act set the lot minimums
at five and twenty-five. 41 It appears that the drafters labored
under the very questionable assumption that only tracts con-
taining more than fifty lots have enough troublesome char-
acteristics to create a need for buyer protection.
Under the Act the sale of a lot in a subdivision proposed
for a fifty-lot development would be within the scope of the
38. S. REP No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1968).
39. Id.
40. ILSFDA §§ 1701(3).
41. 111 CONG. REc. 27,312 (1965) (five) ; 1967 Hearings 5 (twenty-five);
1966 Hearings 244 (twenty-five).
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Act, even though the actual ground work or recordation of all
fifty lots had not been completed. Likewise, two tracts of
twenty-five lots each also come within the purview of the Act
if they are offered as part of a "common promotional plan".
There also exists a presumption that "non-contiguous" lots are
part of such a plan if they are offered by a "single developer,
or group of developers acting in concert and are known, des-
ignated, or advertised as a common unit by a common name".
42
It is not clear from the hearings or the regulations whether
this presumption is rebuttable.
Several problems are presented by the definitions of "sub-
division" as used in subsection 1701(3). The phrases "com-
mon promotional plan" and "developers acting in concert" are
not illustrated or otherwise defined in the Act. Furthermore,
the regulations offer no clue as to how they will be interpreted
by the OILSR. For illustrative purposes, imagine a small de-
velopment which is contiguous to a larger one owned by an-
other developer who must register under the Act. Would the
small developer be acting pursuant to a "common promotional
plan" if he tailored the architectural design and use of his
property after that of the larger developer? What if he used
the same or a similar name as the larger developer? What if
the smaller developer associated the name of the larger de-
velopment into his general advertising scheme, even though
the two had different names? Without further clarification
from the OILSR the developer must request an advisory
opinion from the Secretary in order to have these questions
answered.
A similar problem arises where there exist non-contiguous
tracts of twenty-five lots each, both under the same name and
owned by the same developer, but on different sides of town.
As mentioned above it is presumed that the tracts are part of
the same plan. To what extent is the presumption rebuttable?
If the developer offers evidence to overcome the presumption
that the common name gives, what type of evidence would be
forceful? More importantly, why should the size of the de-
velopment tract be important, if jurisdictional means are
utilized in marketing the development? This requirement pro-
vides the unscrupulous promoter with a means to circumvent
the Act.
42. ILSFDA §§ 1701(3); 1967 Hearings 5; 1966 Hearings 244.
[Vol. 24
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Specific Exemptions
The Act exempts certain lots, offerings, and transactions.
Included in these are the sale or lease of land pursuant to a
court order, transfers or mortgages, the sale of securities is-
sued by a real estate investment trust, dispositions of land by
the government and the sale of cemetery lots. 43 It is apparent
that the legislative logic behind the enactment of these exemp-
tions is the protection afforded by other laws or the unlikely
application to the general lot purchaser. Subsection 1702 (a)
attempts to defeat any possibility that an unscrupulous de-
veloper would adopt one of the exemptions in an effort to cir-
cumvent the Act.
Sec. 1702(a) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the pur-
pose of evasion of this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall not
apply to-
(1) the sale or lease of real estate not pursuant to a common pro-
motional plan to offer or sell fifty or more lots in a subdivision;
(2) the sale or lease of lots in a subdivision, all of which are five
acres or more in size;
(3) the sale or lease of any improved land on which there is a res-
idential, commercial, or industrial building, or to the sale or lease of
land under a contract obligating the seller to erect such a building
thereon within a period of two years;
(4) the sale or lease of real estate under or pursuant to court order;
(5) the sale of evidences of indebtedness secured by a mortgage or
deed of trust on real estate;
(6) the sale of securities issued by a real estate investment trust;
(7) the sale or lease of real estate by any government or government
agency;
(8) the sale or lease of cemetery lots;
(9) the sale or lease of lots to any person who acquires such lots for
the purpose of engaging in the business of constructing residential,
commercial, or industrial buildings or for the purpose of resale or
lease of such lots to persons engaged in such business; or
(10) the sale or lease of real estate which if free and clear of all
liens, encumbrances, and adverse claims, if each and every purchaser
or his or her spouse has made a personal on-the-lot inspection of the
real estate which he purchased and if the developer executes a written
affirmation to that effect to be made a matter of record in accordance
with rules and regulations of the Secretary. As used in this subpara-
graph, the terms "liens", "encumbrances", and "adverse claims" do not
refer to property reservations which land developers commonly convey
or dedicate to local bodies or public utilities for the purpose of bring-
43. ILSFDA §§ 1702 (a) (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), respectively.
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ing public services to the land being developed, nor to taxes and assess-
ments imposed by a State, by any other public body having authority
to assess and tax property, or by a property owners' association, which,
under applicable State or local law, constitute liens on the property be-
fore they are due and payable, nor to beneficial property restrictions
which would be enforceable by other lot owners, or lessees in the sub-
division, if (A) the developer, prior to the time the contract or sale
or lease is entered into, has furnished each purchaser or lessee with a
statement, the form and content of which has been approved by the
Secretary, setting forth in descriptive and concise terms all such re-
servations, taxes, assessments, and restrictions which are applicable
to the lot to be purchased or leased, and (B) receipt of such statement
has been acknowledged in writing by the purchaser or lessee, and a
copy of the acknowledged statement is filed with the Secretary in
accordance with such rules and regulations as he may require.
The developer has the burden of proving that the exemp-
tion is applicable to the lots or offering.4" It was not the in-
tent of Congress to impose a heavy or difficult burden of
proof upon the legitimate, honest and well meaning developer.
Thus, the burden would seem to be met by a showing that the
form or nature of the transaction was consistent with normal
business practices or a custom of the trade.4 5
The Act specifically limits the definition of subdivision
and in so doing creates the possibility that in certain situa-
tions the purpose and intent of the Act may be escaped. Sub-
section 1702 (a) (1) specifically exempts "the sale or lease of
real estate not pursuant to a common promotional plan to offer
or sell fifty or more lots in a subdivision", unless the method
of disposition is adopted for the purpose of evading the Act.
This part of the Act presents a potentially difficult situa-
tion to the developer attempting to comply with its provisions.
For example, suppose a developer has 45 lots which are large
enough to subdivide several times and make into 90 or 135
smaller lots. The developer, should he choose not to divide the
lots, has the burden of proving that his decision was not based
on an intent to evade the Act. Clearly, by having only 45 lots
the developer would be outside the definition of "subdivision".
However, unless he can show that he did not have an evasive
purpose, he would not be entitled to the exemption.
44. If the analogy to the Securities Act is followed, the burden of proof
would be upon the party seeking the exemption. 1 L. Loss, SFcURITIES RGULA-
TiON 712-13 (2d ed. 1961).
45. 21 CASE W. Rxs. L. REV., supra note 31, at 36-37.
[Vol. 24342
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Another exemption applies to a subdivision where each
lot is five acres or larger in size.4 6 The incorporation of this
exemption into the final version of the Act is without apparent
explanation. The exemption did not appear in the earlier
drafts of the Act and is a definite deviation from the Act's re-
ported policy.4 7 Much of the evidence during the hearings in-
dicated that some of the most overt frauds involved the sale
of "investment acreage". Normally, subdivisions are developed
on a large tract basis and may encompass several square miles.
If a developer has large amounts of raw land available, it is
quite possible to divide each lot into 5 or more acres. In fact,
the California Real Estate Commissioner, during the hearing
meeting, told of one condemned development which was
marketed exclusively in five and ten acre lots. 41 This works
both a hardship on the honest developer and an added burden
on OILSR.
It is possible, and in many parts of the country quite
probable, that a developer may have the flexibility, because of
the nature of the land, to make the lots five or more acres in
size. Subsection 1702 (a) places the burden of passing the
evasive purpose test directly on the developer, thus penalizing
the honest developer. At the same time this exemption, as does
the "fifty or more lots" exemption, forces the Secretary to give
the "evasive purpose" test substantial weight, possibly more
weight than is healthy for the continued stability and progress
of the legitimate land market.
The homebuilding industry is primarily responsible for
two exemptions in the Act. Subsections 1702 (a) (3) and
(a) (9) are results of pressure applied by the home building
industry to exempt sales where a person is buying a home or
where the final result would be the sale of a home. There is a
fundamental difference in these two subsections. With respect
to subsection 1702 (a) (3) the exemption is only applicable
where there is a contract obligating the seller to construct a
home on the lot within two years.49 The 1702 (a) (9) exemp-
tion anticipates that a sale is being made to a person who is in
the business of constructing or causing the construction of
46. ILSFDA §§ 1702(a) (2).
47. 1967 Hearings 4-36; 1966 Hearings 243-75.
48. Id. A subdivision composed of 50 five-acre lots would merely encom-
pass three-eights of a square mile.
49. ILSFDA §§ 1702(a) (3).
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buildings. In the latter situation the burden is on the developer
(seller) to be satisfied that when such a sale is made it is not
made to a buyer who will resell immediately before a building
is constructed on the lot.
The exemption provided for a sale under subsection
1702 (a) (9), like the sale of securities by a "controlled" per-
son under the 1933 Securities Act,5 O is incrusted with practical
problems of application. For example, what assurance must
the developer have before he is deemed to incur no liability on
an immediate resale by buyer? That is, what statements from
the buyer may be safely relied upon? Does the ultimate pur-
chaser have recourse against the developer where the pur-
chaser bought from the developer's buyer prior to building?
If so, what elements of proof, if any, will be required from the
remote buyer? These are questions which are bound to arise
and which the regulations fail to clarify.
Further questions have arisen with regard to the
1702 (a) (3) exemption. For example, must the building be
absolutely completed within the two year period in order for
the sale to qualify for the exemption? There seems to be no
specific case law on this matter and no ruling out of OILSR.
It appears to be the general contention of attorneys that one
must look to the "intent and the reasonableness of the attempt
to comply with this exemption". 5' For example, if a sale is be-
ing made where there is a bona fide obligation to construct a
building within two years and a good faith effort to do so is
made, then the exemption would be applicable if there was
substantial completion of the structure. The language of the
statute merely authorizes the exemption where there is a con-
tract obligating the seller to erect the building. It does not
absolutely require completion within two years.
The "homebuilder's" exemptions are illustrative of the
type of pressure that can be applied on the Congress by power-
ful lobbyists. The Act itself grew out of hearings held by
Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey because of his con-
cern over fraudulent practices involving the aged and retired.
52
There is no explanation for the two exemptions in the hearing
reports. A substantial amount of testimony was taken during
50. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o (1970).
51. Robert G. Krechter, Federal Regulation of Real Estate Sales, paper
presented to a meeting of the California Bar Ass'n (May 29, 1969).
52. 1964 Hearings, pt.1.
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the hearings regarding property being offered in remote states
where the individual purchaser had no real opportunity to in-
spect the property. Such offerings were in the swampy por-
tions of Florida and Louisiana, or in the desert regions of Ari-
zona and New Mexico. Apparently, the logic behind the exemp-
tions was that the purchaser of a home would not purchase by
mail without on-the-site inspection of his property. This logic
is inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the Act. Even
the purchaser of a home and lot who thoroughly inspects his
property may not discover certain topographical features or
drainage and flood control characteristics. Likewise, the home
buyer who is unfamiliar with the general area may not be
properly advised on utility facilities, municipal services, or the
condition of the title. These are factors that a statement of
record would disclose. 53 Should these exemptions apply, how-
ever, the homebuilder would have no obligation to furnish the
purchaser with such a statement.
The final exemption to be considered in detail is that of-
fered in subsection 1702 (a) (10) of the Act. Like the two pre-
vious exemptions the legislative history of this exemption of-
fers an interesting study in the legislative process. Lobbyists,
aware of Congress's intent to regulate sight-unseen sales,
argued for a personal inspection exemption, claiming that
sight-unseen sales were the main motivation for legislation.
During consideration of the Act by the Senate, Senator Ful-
bright introduced "on-site" exemption, subsection 1702(a)(10),
which was later amended. The amended section as it now
stands presents the OILSR with the problem of determining
what are "beneficial property restrictions". It may well be
that the determination of this question will have to be an-
swered in each individual situation. If this is the case, then it
would seem that the developer would have to file for an ad-
visory opinion when seeking the on-site exemption. One won-
ders about the judgment demonstrated by the legislative body
in incorporating this exemption into the Act. It is clearly ad-
verse to the purpose of the Act which, by full disclosure in a
property report, assures that purchasers will be exposed to
material information considered essential in order to make a
sound decision to buy.
The regulations demand that the property report include:
(1) the extent to which a buyer might lose his property if the
53. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.105, pts. V-X (1971).
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developer becomes insolvent; (2) the extent to which pro-
posed improvements will be completed; (3) the availability of
necessary utilities, stores, and educational facilities; (4) the
nature of any blanket mortgage or other lien on the develop-
ment; and (5) the extent to which any subsurface or fill work
will be necessary.5 4 Most of this information is not observable
by on-site inspection. In the event of alleged fraud on the part
of the developer, the purchaser would have to resort to pre.
Act common law for a remedy. A better solution would be to
rescind the entire exemption and require a registration and
property report even where there is personal inspection. As
noted above, the on-site exemption is inconsistent with the
purpose of the Act and provides the means to circumvent the
disclosure requirements.
Exemption Advisory Opinion
Several methods of approach are available to the de-
veloper in applying for an exemption. Where the developer
has no reasonable doubt that the offering is exempt (e.g. the
lots are cemetery lots or the offer is of only twenty-five lots
with no future plans to develop more) then he need do nothing
further than rely on the exemption and proceed to market his
land. However, if the developer has any question as to the
applicability of the Act he may request an advisory opinion
from the Secretary.
The advisory opinion may be obtained in either of the
following ways:
(1) The developer may file a Statement of Record as
provided in section 1710.20 of the regulations setting forth the
specific mods operandi by which he disposes or intends to
dispose of the lots. The developer must include a filing fee, a
statement of facts and applicable law under which the de-
veloper believes the offer to be exempt. If the Secretary con-
cludes that the offer is exempt, the developer will be notified
of the opinion, otherwise the provisions of section 1710.20
apply;
(2) The developer may file a partial Statement of Record
along with the filing fee. As in the first alternative, the de-
veloper must state the facts and applicable law under which
the developer believes the offer to be exempt.
54. ILSFDA §§ 1705, 1707(a); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.105-.110 (1971); 34 Fed.
Reg. 5933, 5938 (1969).
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The advantage of the partial method of filing is a sub-
stantial reduction in the amount of material that would ini-
tially be required to be filed as well as in the fee that would
be paid. Normally, in the case of a partial filing the developer
would receive from the OILSR, a letter merely restating the
Statement of Facts which he submitted and, based on these
submitted facts, the Secretary's approval" or disapproval of
the exemption. Where there is a complex factual situation or
unusual circumstances a full filing would appear to save time
and assure that material information was disclosed.
A developer can simply ignore the possibility of an exemp-
tion and file a Statement of Record complying with the Act.
From a conservative viewpoint this is the most advisable ap-
proach. The OILSR has repeatedly stated that a determina-
tion by it that a development is exempt does not effectiveiy
"preclude or abrogate a purchaser's rights under the Act
should the development subsequently prove in fact not to be
exempt". 55 Also, despite a prior favorable exemption opinion,
a developer who willfully deviates from the Act would ap-
parently still be subject to criminal prosecution under subsec-
tion 1703 (a) (2). Furthermore, the filing of a statement pro-
vides prima facie evidence of the developer's representations.
A developer who has filed an effective Statement of Record
may represent to the public, through the Property Report,
that he has filed with the Office of Interstate Land Sales Reg-
istration. However, a developer who is exempt or claims
exemption may not represent to the public through a Property
Report or other means that he has so filed with the OILSR. 0
Finally, once a developer files a Statement of Record and it
becomes effective he is relieved of any further concern re-
garding the filing except to keep OILSR advised of any ma-
terial changes in the development or in its operation. 2
V. REMEDIES OF THE AGGRIEVED
Administrative and Criminal
The developer who violates the Act is subject to adminis-
trative, criminal, and civil sanctions. The administrative and
criminal sanctions provided for in the Act and Regulations
55. Ray Walsh, Consumer Protection it; Land Development Sales, In-
formational release by OILSR (no date).
56. ILSFDA §§ 1707(b).
57. 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.20(c) (1971).
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give the statute "backbone" and needed sting. However, it is
the private civil liabilities which offer the defrauded purchaser
the most direct means to make himself whole. It is these reme-
dies which will be given the greater emphasis in the remain-
ing portion of this article.
The Secretary has broad investigative and injunctive
power and has authority to invoke these powers when he finds
any person to have violated the Act or suspects that the Act is
about to be violated. The Secretary has authority to subpoena
witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any
books, papers, or other relevant material.58 The Secretary
may invoke the aid of any court to issue an order, pursuant to
his authority to subpoena and investigate, demanding the wit-
ness to comply. If a witness refuses to comply with the court
order he shall be held in contempt. A witness may not refuse
to appear and give evidence or be excused from producing rele-
vant material on the ground that the testimony or evidence re-
quired may tend to incriminate him. However, if he claims
the protection of the Fifth Amendment and continues to test-
ify, he cannot later be subject to criminal prosecution because
of that evidence. This does not mean that he would be immune
from civil liability or injunctive relief based upon such evi-
dence.
The power of the Secretary to investigate and grant in-
junctive relief is of prime importance and a great improve-
ment over pre-Act methods. The Secretary is able to utilize
his investigative powers to acquire evidence which will be
helpful to defrauded parties in subsequent civil actions. Many
times in the past the expense involved in undertaking an in-
vestigation was economically impractical for the injured pur-
chaser. Perhaps a more important power given the Secretary
is the power to commence injunctive proceedings against per-
sons who have violated the Act, or who are about to violate
the Act. 9 Prior to the Act the FTC and Postal Department
had injunctive power, but only after a long and lengthy in-
vestigatory process and the show of actual intent to defraud.
Under section 1717 of the Act a person who willfully vio-
lates any provisions of the Act or the Regulations, and is con-
victed may be fined up to $5000 and imprisoned for five years.
58. ILSFDA §§ 1714(c).
59. ILSFDA §§ 1714(a).
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The criminal sanctions of the Act apply regardless of other
remedies open to the Secretary or the purchaser.
Purchaser's Civil Remedies
The Act imposes civil liability on the developer for injury
to a purchaser in a variety of different situations. The Act
does not cut off the purchaser's right to avail himself of
any other remedies to which he is entitled at law or in
equity.60 For example, the purchaser may want to take ad-
vantage of state statutes regulating the sale of land or actions
for damages based on common law fraud. If the purchaser is
successful the court may grant damages under the Interstate
Land Sales Act and punitive damages based on common law
fraud and misrepresentation. This provision of the Act is
very attractive to the defrauded purchaser and, where desir-
able, should be given strong consideration by the purchaser's
attorney. Under the Act the plaintiff may bring his suit in
either federal or state court."- Because of nation-wide service
of process and broad venue provisions, which provide that
suits may be brought in any district where "the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the dis-
trict where the offer or sale took place", the federal court
would seem to be more advantageous. 6
2
The most meaningful way to understand the protective
scope of the private civil remedies offered to the defrauded
purchaser is to compare them with common law and equitable
remedies. Generally speaking, the Act has eliminated the tra-
ditional elements required in order to rely upon various reme-
dies. There are two common law fraud actions under which
one might seek relief: (1) rescission which seeks to restore
the purchaser and seller to his respective status prior to the
transaction; and, (2) deceit which allows a more generous
measure of recovery. 6
3
Each of these common law remedies presented a heavy
burden to the defrauded or misinformed purchaser. The dia-
gram below, figure (1), illustrates the elements which had to
be shown in each case.
60. ILSPDA § 1713.
61. ILSFDA § 1719.
62. Id.
63. W. Possm, HANDBOx OF THE LAW OF ToRTS § 102 (3d ed. 1964).
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EMMEUS OF PROOF
Ccmion Lm.7 I.isrepre- aterial Reliance Privity Scienter Retender Damage Defenses
Fr'aud Action sentation Fact;
Rescission Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Laches,
estoppel
Deceit Yes Yes Justi- No Yes No Yes malver and
fiable ratification
reliance not sdoject
by to equitable
plaintiff defenses.
Figure (1)
It is obvious that the requirements for proving deceit are
greater than the required elements to support rescission. If
in the case of common law deceit punitive damages are sought,
then the plaintiff must show malice. However, since scienter
(i.e., that the defendant knowingly made a false statement to
induce reliance) was required anyway this did not present too
great an additional burden.
As stated earlier, Congress felt the common law remedies
were not adequate to protect the buyer. Thus, Congress
equipped the Interstate Land Sales Act with machinery which
does not rely on these elements in order to obtain relief. For
purposes of simplicity figure (2) illustrates remedial mea-
sures that the Act covers, along with time limitations and the
measure of damages allowed.
The Act makes the sale or lease of land prior to the effec-
tive date of the Statement of Record unlawful.6 4 Likewise,
the Act prohibits the sale or lease of land prior to the pur-
chaser's receipt of a property report. If the developer violates
these provisions the purchaser may rescind the agreement or
sue for damages. 65 The only burden placed upon the purchaser
is to show that he signed the contract before he received the
property report. None of the common law requirements enum-
erated in figure (1) are necessary. .
Subsection 1703 (b) provides a safety measure which as-
sures the purchaser that he is not only to receive a property
report before signing, but that he must have it forty-eight
hours before signing. If the property report is provided to the
purchaser less than forty-eight hours prior to signing the sales
contract then the purchaser has forty-eight hours in which to
64. ILSFDA §§ 1706(a). Effective date is normally the thirtieth day after
filing.
65. ILSFDA §§ 1703(b), 1709(b) and (c).
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revoke the contract. The required forty-eight hour time period
may be waived by the purchaser if: (1) he has received the
property report and inspected the property prior to signing the
contract; and (2) he acknowledges in writing that he has in-
spected the property and read and understood the report.66
Subsections 1709 (a) and (b) (2) of the Act impose lia-
bility if the Statement of Record, on the effective date, or the
property report, at the time of sale, "contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated". The Act imposes express duties on the
developer to use a high degree of care in preparation of the
Statement of Record and property report. Where a subdivi-
sion is covered by the Act, the developer is liable for any false
statements, half-truths, omissions, misrepresentations, and
ambiguities which he might make or which might have rea-
sonably been interpreted from his written statement. The Act
requires the developer to disclose specifically designated items
of information. It is conceivable that the Act is not completely
exhaustive in its requirements and that the developers may
omit a material fact. In such a situation the purchaser would
have to resort to a common law remedy.
The Act further relieves the burden previously on the
purchaser of showing intent on the part of the developer. An
essential element in order to recover for common law deceit
was proving scienter on the part of the developer. The ques-
tion of the intent of the developer under the Act is no longer
an issue. Thus, in the event of an omission, half-truth, or am-
biguity the developer is left absolutely accountable. Even if
the developer could not have ascertained the truth by reason-
able investigation, he is still held liable. Of course, the com-
mon law defenses in an action for rescission are not open to
the developer; but he may, however, plead the running of the
statute of limitations.
The developer has one other form of affirmative defense
open to him under the Act. In many respects it resembles the
common law notion of ratification. While reliance by the pur-
chaser is not necessary to assert a claim against the developer,
nonreliance may be used by the developer as a defense. That
is, subsection 1709 (a) shifts the burden and allows the de-
veloper a defense if he can show that, at the time of the sale,
66. Id.
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the purchaser knew of the falsity or omission. It should be
pointed out, however, that this defense is only applicable to
the Statement of Record and does not apply to falsity or to
omissions in the property report.67 Because the defense is not
open to the developer who makes false statements or omissions
in the property report, the importance of this defense is ques-
tionable. The normal purchaser will never see the Statement
of Record which is on file with the Secretary. Thus, it is un-
likely that he would have knowledge of the correctness or in-
correctness of any claim made in it. Even if the purchaser
did perceive that a statement made in the property report was
false, this knowledge could not be used as a defense by the de-
veloper. From a practical standpoint, therefore, the only ef-
fect that such a situation would have would be to permit re-
covery only for a violation under subsection 1709 (b) (2). 18
It appears that privity is a required element of both sub-
section 1709 (a) and (b) (2). Recovery under subsection
1709 (a) may only be had by a "person acquiring.., from the
developer or his agent" and in subsection 1709 (b) (2) a pur-
chaser may only recover against the "developer or agent, who
sells or leases a lot".
The remedies under subsections 1709 (a) and 1709 (b) (2)
are limited to falsities or omissions made in an effective State-
ment of Record and a property report. If misrepresentation
is made other than in these two documents these subsections
offer no relief. The Act places no restraint on the dissemina-
tion of advertising literature prior to filing a Statement of
Record or prior to the effective date of the statement. It has
been suggested by various writers that a developer could so
condition a prospective purchaser with favorable "propa-
ganda" that the purchaser would disregard the property re-
port when received and be psychologically committed to pur-
chase the land. 69 Another tactic used by a developer might be
to minimize the importance of the property report by making
certain verbal claims or assertions to the prospective pur-
chaser.
Mr. Manuel F. Cohen, then chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, prior to the Act, when it appeared that
67. ILSFDA §§ 1709(b) (2).
68. Id. This subsection applies where the sale is "by means of a property
report which contained an untrue statement of a material fact... '
69. 21 CASE W. Rxs. L. REV., supra note 31, at 62.
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the SEC would administer proposed bill S-275, asked for the
power to promulgate rules controlling the seller's informal
promotional materials.70 This power was never specifically
given then or under the Interstate Land Sales Act. To some
extent this problem may be handled by subsection 1703(a)
(2) (B), which makes it unlawful "to obtain money or prop-
erty by means of a material misrepresentation with respect to
any information contained in the Statement of Record or the
property report or with respect to any other information pert-
inent to the lot or the subdivision and upon which the pur-
chaser relies". It appears that this subsection offers the only
remedy for fraudulent information given by means other than
the Statement of Record and property report. A considerable
problem is presented, however, because the subsection would
appear to require reliance by the purchaser.7 1 It is also un-
clear whether subsection 1703 (a) (2) (B) refers to half-truths
and omissions. It should probably be presumed that by pro-
hibiting "misrepresentations" it was the intent of Congress
(consistent with the disclosure requirements) to require that
the purchaser be given full, complete and accurate informa-
tion.
Another question arises concerning the broadness of sub-
section 1703 (a) (2) (B). That is, does the subsection place
restraints on the technique of "puffing" which has consistently
been sheltered by the common law? The common law allowed
the enthusiastic salesman to express his "opinion" regarding
certain matters pertaining to the property which he was
marketing. The courts looked upon puffing as an accepted
business practice which should be recognized as such and
taken lightly. This placed a hardship on the defrauded pur-
chaser, who, not being able to rely on such statements, found
it difficult to recover.7 2 If recent developments under the Se-
curities Act carry over in the interpretation of subsection
1703 (a) (2) (B) then the common law regarding puffing
should be significantly affected.7 3 Excluding recent SEC
cases, it is inconsistent with the full disclosure policies of the
Act that purchasers should not be entitled to rely on the truth
of such statements.
70. 1967 Hearings 52-53.
71. ILSFDA §§ 1703(a) (2) (B).
72. W. PRossER, supra note 63, at 736-47.
73. 3 L. Loss, SEcurrms REuLAToN 1437-38 (2d ed. 1961).
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If a developer attempts to discourage prospective pur-
chasers from reading the property report he may violate other
sections of the Act. Subsections 1703 (a) (2) (A) and (C) pro-
hibit deceptive business practices of any type. The extent to
which these provisions might be used to restrain high pres-
sure sales tactics is questionable, but clearly they would en-
compass any "device" or "scheme" used to underplay the
property report. The Interstate Land Sales Act has eliminated
the common law requirement of showing a causal connection
between misrepresentation and damages. The Act has seem-
ingly applied strict liability and made material misrepresenta-
tion the sole prerequisite for recovery.
The legislators decided to apply the so-called "out of
pocket" rule to the Act's damage provision. Subsection
1709 (c) of the Act permits recovery for the difference be-
tween the purchase price, plus the reasonable cost of any im-
provements, and the lesser of (1) the value of the land at the
time of suit; (2) the price obtainable before suit was brought;
or, (3) the fair market price at which the property could have
been sold after suit was filed, but before judgment. Generally,
this manner of appraising the measure of damage allows the
purchaser to take advantage of a rising market; however, if
the land value should decline he could take a substantial loss.
VI. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is no doubt that the federal government has en-
tered the land sales industry with awesome force, but the Act
is ridden with problems relating to procedure, interpretation,
and validity. The nature and scope of the Act has not been
made known to the general public and this lack of publicity
has created additional problems: (1) the buyer has no
knowledge of his rights and obligations under the Act; (2) the
unscrupulous developer knows of the buyer's lack of knowl-
edge and takes advantage of it in his advertising scheme; (3)
misleading and undersirable "rumors" regarding the nature
and scope of the Act are published by the news media. The
government could lessen the impact of this incorrect informa-
tion upon the public if it would adopt a program educating the
public to the purpose and scope of the Act.
Besides offering extensive force on the federal level to
combat fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of land, the
Act and Regulations also encourage state legislators to enact
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similar state control. Section 1708 of the Act requires coopera-
tion with state authorities regulating the sale of lots in sub-
divisions; and section 1710.25 of the Regulations recognizes,
as valid for purpose of this Act, registration statements filed
under approved state Acts. This is but one means by which
the Act has influenced outside authorities to take the neces-
sary action to combat shady transactions in the marketing of
land. It is suspected that the land industry itself will place
tighter controls on the developer in an effort to conform to the
intent of the Act. The next few years will prove to be interest-
ing ones in the area of land sales. The Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act should help make it a safer time for the
buyer and a more fruitful period for the honest developer.
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